|
|
PHILOSOPHY MUSIC |
The Changing Meaning of Landscape
Difficulties with landscape The subject of this conference, “landscapes,”
evokes pleasant associations.
Landscapes bring to mind the earliest modern use of the term, in the
seventeenth century, that applied ‘landscape’ to “a picture representing
natural inland scenery.” Only later was
the word ‘landscape’ applied to actual scenery.[1] Both meanings of landscape remain in common
use and have their application to a genre of painting and a tradition of nature
appreciation. At the same time, this meaning of
landscape excludes from consideration much of our present, actual experience of
nature. Because its meaning is
honorific, landscape has no place for scenes of natural devastation: earthquakes, forest fires, flooded city
streets, and tornadoes. Nor does landscape easily embrace most of the
scenes of human life. While the
picturesque allows us to include bucolic settings of rural cottages, flocks of
sheep, and perhaps even charming village scenes, there is no place for the
daily habitation of most of the world’s population in cities and their
peripheral suburbs and slums. It has
been necessary to devise new terms, and expressions such as ‘cityscape’ or
‘urban landscape’ have come into use. Just as landscape restricts the
objects of appreciation to attractive natural scenes, it is also limited in
another, more profound sense. For not
only does the idea of landscape objectify nature; it turns nature into a visual
object, into something to be viewed from a single point. None of the rich sensory scope of nature
appreciation is thus allowed: the
delight in the dank, musty smell of a woodland or the soft verdurous scent of a
meadow. A visual landscape has no place
for the tactile appeal of the textures of bark and foliage, for the kinesthetic
enjoyment of moving along a country road or pursuing a path through a
wood. Vision is blind to the songs of
birds and rustle of wildlife in the underbrush, to the taste of berries and
cold spring water. These rich dimensions
are forsaken when landscape enjoyment is reduced to a visual direction. In recognizing that the experience of
environment is far broader and more varied than the idea of landscape can
accommodate, and to include the diversity and range of the appreciative
experience of nature, the concept of landscape has had to be stretched in many
directions: from an object to an area,
from a visual experience to a multi-sensory one, from natural scenery to the
whole range of human-made transformations of nature. This expansion of the idea of landscape is
further complicated by the fact that landscapes are never stationary but are
constantly in transition. Some changes
are predictable. There are the complex,
superimposed cyclical patterns that result from planetary motion, such as the
diurnal cycle of light and darkness and the succession of seasons. To these we must add the biological cycles
that all living things follow, from inception through growth to inevitable
decline and death. Besides these
regular, predictable changes, catastrophic changes irregularly intrude on those
patterns in the form of both natural disasters and human-caused environmental
calamities. Indeed, landscapes are ever-changing,
but their usual representations are unable to depict this and only occasionally
succeed in evoking their transitoriness in moments rich with impending
change. Transformed from a static array
to a dynamic process, landscape is indeed a transient state of affairs and a
concept that identifies a transitional process.
Burdened with all these limitations, it may be necessary to liberate our
thinking from the constraints of the concept of landscape. Perhaps it would be best to consign the idea
of landscape to its historical purview and look for other ways to aid us in
understanding human experience in nature. Landscape, then, is limited by its
history and common associations to scenic views emulating painting, and to
visual arrays that are either selected in natural surroundings or designed by
architects to mirror their pleasing configurations. It is an idea that, in the light of living
experience, must itself be reformed. Re-thinking landscape What idea would best express the wider
uses and meanings of landscape? What
would allow us to include the varied material conditions in which people live
as well as see, together with the fact of change that is part of a living
landscape? Is there some concept that
can help us transform our idea of landscape from a visual object to a setting
as part of which humans are actively engaged?
For we must acknowledge not only that landscapes do not stand apart from
human activity but that every landscape is a human artifact. Whether framed by a camera, cultivated as
farmland, conserved as a nature reserve, or preserved as so-called wilderness,
every landscape is identified and chosen by humans, and embodies and displays
the effects of human action. A promising successor to the idea of
landscape is “environment.” This concept
does not tend to constrict our experience to the natural world, as does
landscape. It does not limit that
experience to visual perception alone but readily engages all the sensory
receptors. Environment also admits the
world of human construction more readily:
the city, the highway, the farm, the suburb, the industrial “park,” and
the shopping mall, so that we speak easily of the urban environment, and we
even extend the natural environment to include the atmosphere.[2] Moreover, when we replace landscape by
environment, we are no longer confined to visuality. Environment is not an object but is connected
with a human presence. There is a danger, however, in
replacing landscape with environment, for environment also carries baggage that
is false to experience. It, too, can be
objectified, so that we easily refer to the
environment, as if environment were an object, a thing apart and isolable. The science of ecology, however, has made us
realize the fact that environments are systemic, that they are living systems
in which all the physical and organic constituents function in a complex
reciprocal interrelationship. We should,
therefore, speak of “environment” rather than “the environment.” Insofar as
humans are concerned, we are a functioning part of every environmental
system. So environment is never “out
there;” it is always “here.” The concept of environment is, then,
broader than that of landscape. It is
fuller by including more conditions, built as well as natural. It is fuller by engaging all our sensory
modalities, not just the visual. And it is
fuller by relinquishing any claims to objectivity and recognizing the
continuity of human presence and participation.
Most important of all, it is fuller because it enables us to recognize
that every environment embodies a wide range of values in relation to human
uses. For landscape as environment is
not neutral but embraces a complex mix of values. The normative significance of environment is
profound.[3] Negative aesthetics Like landscape, the extended meaning
of environment includes its beauties, and among the aesthetic values of
environment, beauty is what we most readily associate with nature.[4] It is, I suspect, the source of much of our
fascination with natural landscapes and it is the motivation of much nature
poetry and nature writing. Beauty,
together with its relative, the sublime, is a motive and a reward for our free
activities in nature: hiking, camping,
gardening, sightseeing. And an encounter
with the sublime may be the principal reason for the search for ultimate
experiences in nature, such as mountaineering, extended voyages in small boats,
lengthy treks in wilderness areas, and voluntary encounters with extreme
environmental conditions. But making this elaborate case for an
ecological conception of environment just to acknowledge its beauty could
easily be accused of belaboring the obvious.
That has not been its purpose, however.
Once we understand how the human presence imports values into the
landscape, environment becomes rich with normative significance, for it is
suffused with a full range of values in relation to human activities. Recognizing this is significant because it
not only extends the scope of appreciation but it allows us to recognize and
judge the scope and variety of environmental values.[5] There is a tendency to romanticize our
encounter with nature, and to think of nature as landscape tempts us easily
into the error of thinking of it as always positive.[6] We have seen how considering nature as
landscape leads to objectifying nature, seeing it as separate and apart from
humans, and confining it to pleasing visual experience. It is tempting to externalize nature as the
“outside world” and romanticize it, regarding scenic nature as valuable largely
because it is one of our rare encounters with purity: the delicacy of a simple flower, the nobility
of the panoramic view from a great height, the immediate delight in the glint
of sunlight on the foliage. These have a
directly emotional appeal and we value those experiences. On such occasions a profound intimacy develops,
an almost mystical bond. Such
experiences may be among the deepest sources of human connectedness, not only
with nature but also with one another.
Schiller wrote compellingly of this, calling the aesthetic condition a
whole that is self-sufficient. But he
went further in considering the aesthetic to be the ground of morality. [7] Finding the basis of morality in the
aesthetic can be related to Schiller’s claim that the experience of beauty
instills a social character in humans by establishing harmony in individuals
and from thence into society.[8] Yet the rich experience of beauty in
environment tends to blind us to other values more characteristic of everyday
human situations. In fact, the human
influence is pervasive: one can argue
that “nature untouched by man” is a romantic myth. The fact is that the human hand has left its
mark everywhere, from the polar icecaps to the ocean depths, and the experience
of environment is not always positive.
One of the most powerful motives behind the global environmental
movement comes from recognizing the abuse and degradation that characterize
environmental practices. Such negative
values involve not only the ethical criticism of wasteful and destructive
practices and their widespread harmful effects on the planet but they include
the fact that such practices also offend our sensibility; that is, they have
aesthetic as well as moral consequences.
Indeed, the literature of environmental ethics often acknowledges an aesthetic
underpinning of ethical values.[9] For aesthetics, both etymologically
and conceptually, concerns perceptual experience, and this suggests thinking of
the aesthetic as developed sensibility.[10] All environmental experience is, ipso facto, perceptual, and positive
occasions of beauty occupy but a portion of such experience. We find frequent offenses to our aesthetic
sensibility not only in the abuses of nature from narrow-minded, heedless,
exploitative construction and industrialization but also in abuses in the built environments of our urban
centers. To be sure, most cities contain
oases of natural beauty, such as parks and preserves, but they are often
surrounded by an urban desert.
Recognizing this has led to an increasing effort to landscape highways
and install trees on city streets.
Residents, too, often plant gardens and arrange flower boxes and pots
around their dwellings in an effort to ameliorate their immediate environment. But these only emphasize by contrast
the pervasive aesthetic disagreeableness of much urban experience. Consider the offense to sensibility in the aesthetic intrusion of the noise
produced by motor vehicles, machinery, public loudspeakers, and now inescapable
cell phone conversations. Then there is
what we might call aesthetic pain from
the noxious fumes emitted by motor vehicles that combine with emissions from
coal and oil furnaces and toxic industrial effluents. We suffer aesthetic
distortion not only from drugs that are endemic in modern life but from
sensory filters like smog and colored lenses that affect color perception and
from electronic sounds and the strident colors of signage. Moreover, most city dwellers, except for the
privileged, suffer aesthetic deprivation
from inadequate exposure to natural light and to the sun, from the cramped
spaces of housing and of many public places, from conditioned and re-used air,
and other forms of sensory impoverishment.
To this list of aesthetic affronts we must add the aesthetic (i.e. sensory)
depravity from the environment we
ingest in addictive foods with high sugar and fat content, from sensory excess
of alcohol, sex, or drugs, and in a perceptual consciousness infiltrated by hard porn and vulgar
amusements. Indeed, our full sensibility is
affected by these and other such conditions, for we perceive sensorially not
through discrete and separate channels but rather synaesthetically in
perceptual wholes. In addition to the
customary list of senses that include sight, hearing, smell, tactility, and
taste, there are modes of organic sensibility.
We have a kinesthetic sense that involves muscular awareness, and we
experience skeletal or joint sensation through which we perceive position and
an awareness of solidity through the degrees of resistance of surfaces. Moreover, our bodies possess a
vestibular system located in the labyrinth of the inner ear through which we
are aware of body movement and balance in climbing and descending, turning and
twisting, encountering obstructions and moving freely. In addition to our sense receptors, our
vestibular system imparts a somatic sensitivity to mass and height. The built environment may also challenge this
domain of sensibility, for decisions involving architectural design, urban
planning, and traffic circulation often ignore the human body in favor of
mechanical efficiency and narrow utilitarian considerations of economy and
convenience in design and execution. As
a consequence, most cities trap their inhabitants in a scale of mass and space
that is overpowering and that oppresses and diminishes the human body. Skyscrapers are a monument to engineering
technology; like giant tombstones, they loom above a population they have
buried. Heavy vehicular traffic acts as
a moving barrier to free walking, and speeding vehicles appear out of nowhere
to cut down the unwary pedestrian. And
even the proximity of thick crowds of human traffic is an invasion of one’s
intimate space. Disturbances of scale in
relation to the human body and its activities are endemic in urban experience. It is, of course, true that an
increasing awareness of the inimical character of the modern city has
stimulated important efforts to ameliorate the most egregious offenses. Pedestrian malls and streets are becoming
increasingly common (although vehicles still insidiously manage to penetrate
them). Some cities have passed noise
ordinances and pollution control regulations.
Many cities whose history has provided them with the gift of
pre-industrial, historic districts have endeavored to preserve their
character. And some far-sighted cities
like Paris and Helsinki like Paris and Helsinki have established height
limitations in their central districts.
For all the ocularity of modern Western culture, we have been blind to
visual oppression in the strident signage of commercial districts. Aesthetic sensibility thus covers a
wide range. I do not mean to denigrate
the city for, from its earliest history, urban life has been the center of the
arts, of education, of culture, of civilization itself. But I mourn its abuses and its failures all
the more from an awareness of its possibilities. Of course, cities are not the only site of
negative environmental aesthetic experience.
There is an even longer history of the abuse of nature. Degraded and denuded mountains have long been
a casualty of human misuse, and examples can be found throughout the world,
from ancient Greece and Italy to the present-day Philippines and the Large
Menderes Basin in Turkey. Deforestation
is especially intense in tropical regions across the globe and has become a
major environmental issue today in the rapid deforestation of the Amazon basin
in Brazil. The negative sublime There is another domain of the
aesthetic whose negative form must also be recognized: the sublime.
In traditional thinking, the sublime signifies a powerful and elevating
experience of nature that, from its very forcefulness, exceeds our ability to
comprehend it rationally. We encounter
the sublime tremblingly and with fear yet without actually being endangered. The classic accounts of Burke and Kant associate
the feeling of the sublime with such things as the breathtaking view from a
mountaintop, the magnitude of the starry sky, and the power of a raging storm
viewed in safety from a protected coast. [11] Kant drew a helpful distinction between the
mathematical and the dynamical sublime.
In the first, the magnitude of the absolutely great is a measure that
imagination cannot wholly encompass,[12]
whereas the second, the dynamical sublime, involves the fear for our safety
that we feel in response to the enormous power of nature.[13] The sublime is an intriguing notion
and continues to fascinate scholars, but it has a negative dimension that has
not generally been recognized. The
sublime is valuable for identifying not only the overwhelming experience of awe
among the towering peaks of a mountain range, but also the overwhelming feeling
of oppression amidst the towering skyscrapers of the modern city. Indeed, on such occasions one finds the very
features associated with the sublime:
awe, fear evoked by irresistible power or massiveness without actually
being in immediate danger. Unhappily,
however, the negative sublime occurs as well in modern nature suffering under
the human hand. Familiar examples appear
in industrial failures: the oil slick
from a grounded tanker or an uncapped oil well covering an area whose extent
can hardly be encompassed by a satellite photo,[14]
surface mining operations that create endless expanses of slimy devastation,[15] and mountaintop removal. The unimaginable has become fact. Like the starry sky for Kant, what we
can see is but a fragment of a whole that the power of the imagination cannot
encompass. Kant thought that reason or
the understanding could accommodate the sublime in a rational judgment, such as
the idea of infinity.[16] Without Kant’s rationalistic and religious
reassurances, we may try to give the negative sublime the guise of rationality
by transforming the overwhelming power or the wide, indeterminate extent of the
devastation into the pseudo-rationality of a numerical calculation, a
mega-number. But it is necessary to
question the possibility of conceptualizing the negative sublime using a visual
or mathematical methodology for, In these human-made disasters in nature, even
a satellite photo is but a small representation of its extent, both below the
surface of the water and in the larger ecosystem. And its effects must be multiplied endlessly
as they ripple outward both in space and in time. A photograph is but a synecdoche of an
inconceivable and unimaginable whole.
For such reasons, one can say that the negative sublime exceeds both
imagination and reason. The idea of the sublime is intriguing
because it identifies a limitation of our capacity to encompass nature by
rational thought. As human actions
continue to radiate in every direction, the idea of the sublime, originally
elaborated in the eighteenth century, has reappeared to help explain
experiences in the world of our time.
The late twentieth-century French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard
applied the concept of the sublime to assist in understanding the modern and
post-modern worlds. The modern aesthetic
of the sublime, he held, “present(s) the fact that the unpresentable
exists.” It makes present something that
can be conceived and yet cannot be made visible.[17] The modern sublime, he claims, presents the
unpresentable in the identity of consciousness (Proust) and in the very writing
itself (Joyce), as the missing contents, while retaining the solace of a
recognizable form in the genre of the novel.[18] The sublime, then, cannot be fully
presented but is rather a feeling evoked by something we can experience, a
presentation of the unpresentable. In
this respect Lyotard seems to be in accord with Kant.[19] For Kant, as well, the sublime presents the
unimaginable, but while imagination cannot comprehend the enormity of its
magnitude, reason can claim absolute totality.
The fact that we are capable, through reason, of thinking infinity as a
whole “indicates a faculty of the mind which surpasses every standard of
sense.”[20] But when Lyotard describes the postmodern
sublime, he differs sharply from thinking of it as rationally
determinable. The postmodern sublime,
Lyotard holds, conveys a stronger sense of the unpresentable: what makes it different is its inconclusiveness. The work does not conform to any rule but
rather has the character of an event. [21] Characterizing the sublime as the
presentation of the unpresentable makes it adaptable to a negative aesthetics.[22] And although Lyotard’s reference is to the arts,
his concept of the sublime can easily be applied more generally to the
contemporary world overall. The feeling
of a negative sublime is evoked by our awareness of the unpresentable in the
colossal extent of recent environmental disasters. Like Kant’s mathematical sublime, the
environmental damage of a major oil spillage to wildlife, to the ecosystem
itself, is incalculable quantitatively in the lives affected or extinguished
and is incalculable qualitatively in the disruption of the complex balance of
the ecosystem. But there are occasions when the
negative sublime is difficult to approach perceptually because the consequences
are so indeterminately extensive in time as well as in space as to be
unimaginable. The awesome possibilities
of a nuclear disaster have only been anticipated by the events at Chernobyl and
in Japan. The consequences of a nuclear
war for the human environment exceed our comprehension even more. The effects of the melting of the polar ice
caps are not only climatological but astronomical. Indeed, the scale of the consequences of
global warming is unimaginable. The
power of such occasions suggests Kant’s dynamical sublime. As in Lyotard’s postmodern sublime,
where the unpresentable cannot be referenced by a form, the negative sublime
cannot provide the intellectual comfort of a totality, even in the idea of
infinity.[23] What Lyotard claims for art applies, a fortiori, to the modern world, where
we cannot conceive the unpresentable in the events and situations we have identified. Burke had thought that what distinguishes the
sublime is the overpowering feeling of terror.[24] The negative sublime denotes a condition for
which terror may be the only appropriate response.[25] We have seen how the negative sublime can be
applied not only to natural disasters but to cataclysmic environmental
catastrophes that result from human actions and practices. Moreover, Kant’s distinction between
magnitude and power cannot easily be retained, for the disasters that result
from human misuse render such a distinction pointless. Both overwhelming magnitude and incalculable
power are inconceivable, although the fear may, so to speak, become
tangible. Lyotard’s formulation may be
more germane. The postmodern sublime, he
holds, makes “the unpresentable perceptible.”[26] That is what the industrial images of Edward
Burtynsky do.[27]
That is what the photographic reports of
the nuclear disaster in Japan do. That
is what the symptomatic metaphors of poetry can do. But it is when the unpresentable cannot
even be made perceptible that the negative sublime comes fully into its own. Perhaps only the mediating metaphors of
literature are capable of evoking in indirect perception the negative dynamical
sublime we experience in the insidiously imperceptible power of the modern
state, of the global corporation, and of mass social movements. To make such invisible power present, to
present the imperceptible, as in the blind brutality of mass movements, the
metaphorical resources of literature may be the most effective means (Kafka). Conclusion I began by acknowledging the uplifting
beauty in the romantic conception of landscape.
That picture has darkened radically over the course of this
discussion. However, I do not want to
end on an entirely dissonant note. For
hidden in this cacaphony is a purer sound that is mostly drowned out by the
surrounding blare. It is possible, though
not likely, that reason and humane judgment may prevail over our barbaric
condition, and that they will re-direct the powers exemplified by the negative
sublime toward a world in which human energy will serve human hope, and where
avariciousness and force will be consigned to the slag heap of the meanest
human motives. In their place will arise
a positive aesthetics out of the mutual concern and material abundance of which
the human world is capable. [1] The Oxford English Dictionary identifies
three successive usages of ‘landscape:’
(1) a picture representing
natural inland scenery, (2) a view of
natural inland scenery taken at a glance from one point of view, and (3) a
combination of both meanings: “Inland
natural scenery, or its representation inting.”
Cf. OED (Oxford, 1933) Vol.
VI, p. 54/1. This may be the original
instance of nature imitating art and the converse of the usual meaning of
imitation in painting. [2] In 2009 an
international conference was held in Heinävesi, Finland on the theme of
“Celestial Aesthetics: The Aesthetics of
Sky, Space and Heaven.” This was the
seventh and final conference in a series on the environmental aesthetics of
different landscapes. [3] I have developed this account of environment
in a number of publications, especially The Aesthetics of Environment
(Philadelphia: Temple University
Press,1992). See also Living
in the Landscape: Toward an Aesthetics
of Environment (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas,1997) and Aesthetics and Environment,
Variations on a Theme (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) [4] See Yrjö
Sepänmaa, The Beauty of Environment: A General Model for Environmental Aesthetics (Helsinki: Annales
Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, 1986; Second Edition, Denton, TX: Environmental
Ethics Books, 1993). [5] The
journal, Environmental Values,
devotes itself to this subject. As its
website states, “Environmental Values is an international peer-reviewed
journal that brings together contributions from philosophy, economics,
politics, sociology, geography, anthropology, ecology and other disciplines,
which relate to the present and future environment of human beings and other
species. In doing so we aim to clarify the relationship between practical
policy issues and more fundamental underlying principles or assumptions.” For more information, consult its
website: http://www.erica.demon.co.uk/EV.html. [6] Allen
Carlson argues for what he calls “positive aesthetics.” He claims that “the natural world, insofar as
it is untouched by man, has mainly positive aesthetic qualities….” See “Nature and Positive Aesthetics,” in Aesthetics and the Environment; The
appreciation of nature, art and architecture (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 72. I cannot agree with Carlson’s claim but this
is not the place to debate it. [7] F.C.S.
Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic
Education of Man (New York: Ungar,
1965), especially Letters 21-23. See
also endnote 8 and the comment that it corroborates. [8] Op. cit., p. 138 (Letter 27). [9] See Eugene
C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental
Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), ch. 3. [10] See Arnold
Berleant, Preface to Aesthetics beyond the Arts (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming 2012). [11] Edmund
Burke, Philosophical Inquiry into the
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). See especially Part One, Section VII; Part
Two, Sections I and II; and Part IV, Section III. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, §27 and §28. [12] Critique of Judgment, §28. [13] Ibid., §27. [14] Examples
are easily cited, such as the oil spill caused by the grounding of the tanker
Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska in 1989 and the BP oil well
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. [15] Some
examples are the Jubilee Operations of gold mining companies in Kalgoorie,
Western Australia and the tailings from uranium mining in Elliot Lake, Ontario,
Canada, both photographed by the Canadian photographer Edward Burtynsky. [16] This is
not the place to discuss Kant’s theory of the sublime or to develop a critique
of the many assumptions and difficulties that it harbors, such as a
superordinate rationality and the assurance of a benign God. See The
Critique of Judgment, §28. [17] Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on Knowledge (1979) (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 78. [18] Ibid., pp.
80-81. [19]
“ For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word,
cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason,
which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited
and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of
sensuous presentation. Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be called
sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored one's mind in advance
with a rich stock of ideas, if such an intuition is to raise it to the pitch of
a feeling which is itself sublime-sublime because the mind has been incited to
abandon sensibility and employ itself upon ideas involving higher
finality.” Critique of Judgment
§23, trans. James Creed Meredith (Univ.
of Virginia Library, Electronic Text Center). [20] Critique
of Judgment, §26. [21]
Jean-François Lyotard, The
Postmodern Condition, p. 81.
[22] The
question of when negative aesthetics becomes the negative sublime may be
approached from Kant’s suggestion that the sublime resides in the mind of the
one who judges and not in the natural object when the imagination is inadequate
in encompass its ideas §26, p.
95. I first discussed the negative sublime in Arnold
Berleant, Living in the Landscape:
Toward an Aesthetics of Environment (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1997), ch. 4, and
later explored its social and political manifestations in Sensibility and Sense: The
Aesthetic Transformation of the Human World (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), ch. 10. [23] Infinity
actually offers a false sense of totality since, by definition, it is
indeterminate. [24] See Edmund
Burke, Philosophical Inquiry into the
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Part One, Section VII;
Part Two, Sections I and II; Part IV, Section III; pp. 36, 53-54,119. [25] Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, pp. 81-82. [26] Jean-François
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p.
81; “The sublime and the avant-garde,” in The
Lyotard Reader, ed. Andrew Benjamin (Blackwell: Cambridge, MA, 1989), p. 207. [27] The work
of Edward Burtynsky documents powerfully the prevalence of the negative
aesthetic in industrial societies. See http://www.edwardburtynsky.com/
|